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Human language and social cognition are closely linked: advanced social cognition is necessary for children
to acquire language, and language allows forms of social understanding (and, more broadly, culture) that
would otherwise be impossible. Both ‘‘language’’ and ‘‘social cognition’’ are complex constructs, involving
many independent cognitive mechanisms, and the comparative approach provides a powerful route to
understanding the evolution of such mechanisms. We provide a broad comparative review of mechanisms
underlying social intelligence in vertebrates, with the goal of determining which human mechanisms are
broadly shared, which have evolved in parallel in other clades, andwhich, potentially, are uniquely developed
in our species. We emphasize the importance of convergent evolution for testing hypotheses about neural
mechanisms and their evolution.Language and Social Cognition Are Closely Linked
Social cognition encompasses a number of distinctive capac-
ities, including social learning, imitation, gaze following, and
theory of mind (TOM). Such mechanisms form core elements
of animal social behavior and human imitative culture. Language
can be defined as a bidirectional system that permits the expres-
sion of arbitrary thoughts as signals and the reverse interpreta-
tion of those signals as thoughts. Although most animals have
communication systems that allow some biologically important
concepts or emotions to be expressed vocally, visually, or other-
wise, humans appear to be unique in possessing a system that
allows any concept we can entertain to be expressed and under-
stood. Yet although language itself is unique to our species,
many of the mechanisms underlying it are shared with other
species (Fitch, 2010).
Social cognition is closely linked to the evolution of language.
Advanced social cognition is required for children to acquire
language: sophisticated ‘‘mind-reading’’ abilities are necessary
to deduce word meanings and communicate pragmatically
(Clark, 1987; Macnamara, 1972). Second, once in place,
language provides a powerful new tool for social cognition,
one that is at the center of human culture. Our capacity to share
thoughts socially allows human cultures to accumulate knowl-
edge in a way that would be impossible without language and
underpins the progressive accumulation of complexity seen in
most aspects of culture, from science and technology to myth
and religion. Together, social cognition and language probably
formed an evolutionary cycle wherein advances in one fed
advances in the other, and it is unclear what human cognition
(social or otherwise) would be like without the powerful cultural
augmentation that language provides. Research on nonhuman
animals can play a central role in understanding the evolution
of social cognition on its own, nonlinguistic, terms.
Multiple Mechanisms Are Needed for Language
Although language appears as a seamless whole, with pho-
nology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatic processes working
together, many dissociable mechanisms underlie linguisticcompetence. These mechanisms together make up the faculty
of language in a broad sense, and most of them exist in some
form in other animals. We can roughly classify these mecha-
nisms by whether they involve signaling (e.g., perceptual and
motor systems underlying speech and sign), semantics (central
cognitive mechanisms supporting concept formation, expres-
sion, and interpretation), or syntax (structure-generating mecha-
nisms thatmap between signals and concepts). Both signals and
semantics have a strong social component. Signals used in
linguistic communication, whether spoken, signed, or written,
must be learned and shared among the members of a linguistic
community, and this shared lexicon requires sophisticated imita-
tion of complex signals. Semantic interpretation requires an
ability to infer the intentions of a signaler based on rather indirect
cues (such as gaze direction). When a child hears the word
‘‘rabbit’’ spoken, a huge number of possible meanings might
be inferred (e.g., ‘‘cute,’’ ‘‘furry,’’ ‘‘hopping,’’ ‘‘dinner’’). Despite
this complexity (Macnamara, 1972; Quine, 1970), children typi-
cally hone in unerringly on the intended meaning of a speaker
by relying on conceptual constraints on possible word meanings
(Clark, 1987; Markman, 1990). Many of these constraints are
shared with other species, suggesting that a rich set of concep-
tual building blocks was already in place before language evolu-
tion began (Cheney and Seyfarth, 2007; Kaminski et al., 2004;
Seyfarth and Cheney, 2005).
Finally, human language rests upon a rich pragmatic basis
(Grice, 1975), including a strong motivation to share novel infor-
mation with others. This drive to sharemeaning seems so natural
to us that it has taken many years to realize that it is very unusual
among animals, with the closest parallel perhaps being the
honeybee dance ‘‘language’’ (Hockett, 1960; Lindauer, 1971).
But the drive to share novel information requires a signaler to
know what the intended recipient does and does not know
(TOM). Nonhuman primates generally fail to take receiver’s
knowledge into account when signaling (e.g., Cheney and
Seyfarth, 1980; Rendall et al., 2000), suggesting that TOM, to
the extent that it is present at all, is not employed pragmaticallyNeuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 795
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language acquisition include a capacity for imitation for the
signaling component, and mind-reading and TOM for the
semantic and pragmatic components. Numerous studies in
animal cognition provide insight into the evolution of these
mechanisms.
Building Cognitive Phylogenies: Homology
and Convergence
Researchers in comparative cognition study multiple species,
seeking to uncover similarities and differences in each of these
cognitive mechanisms, studied at multiple levels of description,
including the genetic, neural, and behavioral levels. Such similar-
ities allow us to generate and test hypotheses about the
evolution of cognition. Two broad kinds of similarities need to
be distinguished, termed ‘‘homology’’ and ‘‘analogy,’’ both of
which play important roles in cognitive phylogenetics.
Homologous mechanisms (homologs) are shared by descent
from a common ancestor that possessed the mechanism. For
example, the differences in imitation abilities between apes
and monkeys have been used to infer that the last common
ancestor (LCA) of humans and great apes had well-developed
imitation capacities, while the LCA of apes and monkeys did
not. Similarly, the existence of trichromatic color vision in Old
World monkeys, apes, and humans indicates that trichromacy
evolved in the LCA of all catarrhines (Jacobs, 1996). Nonhuman
primates have traditionally been the focus of comparative
research on social cognition, typically by researchers seeking
homologs of humanmechanisms in order to infer the capabilities
of our extinct ancestors.
Recently, comparative research on social cognition has
broadened considerably to include nonprimate mammals
(dogs, rats, goats), many bird species (especially among corvids:
jays, crows, ravens, and their relatives), reptiles, fish, and social
insects (Table 1). Results of this work have often seemed
surprising, revealing cognitive abilities in dogs or ravens that
are lacking in our closer primate relatives. But surprise at such
results is unwarranted, reflecting an outmoded ‘‘scala naturae’’
view of evolution in which cognitive capacities increase with a
species’ relatedness to humans (Striedter, 2004). From amodern
Darwinian viewpoint, we instead expect a species’ cognitive
abilities to evolve to fit its ‘‘cognitive niche.’’ For example, we
expect species relying on complex navigation to evolve excellent
spatial memory, and species living in complex social environ-
ments to exhibit superior social cognition. This perspective leads
us to expect convergent evolution of analogous cognitive mech-
anisms (analogs) in widely separated species that face similar
cognitive problems.
Evolutionary Hypotheses Can Be Tested Using
Convergence
The ‘‘social intelligence hypothesis’’ is a leading contemporary
hypothesis that attempts to explain the evolution of intelligence,
in general, as a result of selection for social intelligence in partic-
ular (Byrne, 1997; Dunbar, 2003; Humphrey, 1976; Jolly, 1966).
It follows from the simple fact that the most cognitively chal-
lenging entities most organisms must cope with are other
animals, often conspecifics. This hypothesis contrasts with the
older ‘‘physical intelligence hypothesis’’ that supposes that
intelligence, particularly human intelligence, is the result of796 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.intense selection for the use of tools and other manipulations
of the environment.
Crucially, such contrasting hypotheses can be tested using
convergent evolution. Because analogs reflect independent
evolutionary events, they constitute statistically independent
samples that can support rigorous testing of evolutionary
hypotheses. In contrast, homologous mechanisms by definition
evolved once, and their presence inmultiple descendent species
constitutes only a single data point. The 4000 or so passerine
birds with vocal learning represent but a single evolutionary
event. It is important to recognize, however, that convergent
evolution can occur in homologous substrates. For example,
hippocampal enlargement has apparently evolved repeatedly
in different species of food-caching birds. Although the hippo-
campus itself is a homolog in these species, the episodes of
enlargement are convergent and represent independent events.
Furthermore, capabilities that are convergent at one level (e.g.,
behavioral) may employ mechanisms that are homologous at
another level (e.g., genetic). The use of the same genes in the
specification of convergently evolved traits appears to be
surprisingly common in development, and we can expect
many examples in the cognitive realm (Fitch, 2009b). Thus,
whether a given cognitive mechanism is homologous or conver-
gent in a phylogenetic analysis depends on the hypothesis being
tested and the level of analysis.
In this paper, we review comparative research on social cogni-
tion, aiming to build tentative cognitive phylogenies of the mech-
anisms underlying social intelligence, and to test evolutionary
hypotheses concerning such mechanisms. This broad compar-
ative approach, which we call ‘‘cognitive phylogenetics,’’ has
substantial promise to fuel our understanding of the evolution
and neural basis of both human language and culture, and social
cognition more generally. Although current data remain too
incomplete to support definitive conclusions, they point to
gaps in our present knowledge, and allow us to reject some
long-standing assumptions about animal social cognition.
Finally, we discuss the implications of empirical data from
animals for hypotheses about language evolution.
Social Cognition Involves Multiple Mechanisms
Social cognition involves a set of interacting but separable
mechanisms, and the recent literature has led to an extensive
dissection of social cognition and a correspondingly daunting
profusion of terms. In this section, we discuss two sets of mech-
anisms: the use of gaze direction to infer another’s focus of
attention, and of TOM, in which one organism represents what
another one does or doesn’t know.
Gaze Detection Is Shared Widely among Vertebrates,
whereas Geometric Gaze Following May
Be Restricted to a Few Species
For humans, monitoring others’ head and eye orientation (gaze)
is a central feature of social life and communication (Brooks and
Meltzoff, 2002), even influencing eye anatomy (Kobayashi and
Kohshima, 2001). Newborn humans are already responsive
to their mothers’ visual orientation (Farroni et al., 2002), and
coordination with others’ head and eye orientation to look in
the same direction (gaze following) or at a specific target (joint
visual attention) develops during early ontogeny (Butterworth
Table 1. Species and Clades Studied in Contemporary Social Cognition Research
Common Name Genus Species Major Clade Minor Clade
Vertebrates Common Marmoset Callithrix jacchus class Mammalia order Primates
Chimpanzee Pan troglodytes 00 00 00 00
Orangutan Pongo pygmaeus 00 00 00 00
Capuchin Cebus apella 00 00 00 00
Rhesus Macaque Macaca mulatta 00 00 00 00
Bottlenose Dolphins Tursiops truncatus 00 00 order Cetacea
Humpback Whale Megaptera novaeangliae 00 00 00 00
Harbor Seal Phoca vitulina 00 00 suborder Pinnipedia
S. African Fur Seal Arctocephalus pusillus 00 00 00 00
Domestic Dog Canis familiaris 00 00 order Carnivora
Domestic Goat Capra hircus 00 00 order Artiodactyla
Greater Sac-Winged Bat Saccopteryx bilineata 00 00 order Chiroptera
Japanese Quail Coturnix japonica class Aves order Galliformes
Pigeon Columba livia 00 00 order Columbiformes
Bald Ibis Geronticus eremita 00 00 order Threskiornithidae
Budgerigar Melopsittacus undulatus 00 00 order Psittaciformes
Kea Nestor notabilis 00 00 00 00
African Gray Parrot Psittacus erithacus 00 00 00 00
European Starling Sturnus vulgaris 00 00 order Passeriformes
Woodpecker Finch Cactospiza pallida 00 00 00 00
Swamp Sparrow Melospiza georgiana 00 00 00 00
Zebra Finch Taeniopygia guttata 00 00 00 00
Bengalese Finch Lonchura striata domestica 00 00 00 00
New Caledonian Crow Corvus moneduloides 00 00 family Corvidae
Raven Corvus corax 00 00 00 00
Rook Corvus frugilegus 00 00 00 00
Scrub Jay Aphelocoma californica 00 00 00 00
Archerfish Toxotes chatareus infraclass Teleostei family Toxotidae
Red-footed Tortoise Geochelone carbonaria class Reptilia family Testudinae
Nonvertebrates Octopus Octopus vulgaris phylum Mollusca class Cephalopoda
Honeybee Apis mellifera class Insecta order Hymenoptera
This table provides taxonomic information regarding the species discussed in this review. Only the common name is used in the main text. The major
and minor clades help to contextualize the phylogenetic position of these species utilizing traditional Linnaean classifications, even when (as for class
‘‘Reptilia’’) this traditional grouping is polyphyletic.
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2004). These capacities undergird word learning via joint atten-
tion, and are considered a crucial step toward an understanding
of mental states like attention and intention (Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Tomasello et al., 2005). Gaze processing is a central aspect of
human social intelligence. Unlike pointing (which has received
much attention in the primate-centered literature), directed
gaze is possible for virtually any vertebrate.
Long underestimated, the importance of gaze for nonhuman
animals is receiving increased interest (reviewed in Go´mez,
2005). Different levels of gaze responsiveness may be distin-
guished in animals (Figure 1, cf. Povinelli and Eddy, 1996;
Schloegl et al., 2007). The most basic level concerns simple
detection of others’ gaze direction, particularly the awareness
that one is being looked at. Gaze detection seems to be based
on relatively simple mechanisms (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Povinelliet al., 1999) that are phylogenetically widespread (reviewed in
Emery, 2000), presumably because of their relevance to social
or antipredator behavior.
A second level of gaze responsiveness concerns the following
of others’ gaze direction. Originally described in primates (Povi-
nelli and Eddy, 1996a; Tomasello et al., 1998), gaze following
has now been demonstrated in distantly related mammals
(dogs, Miklo´si et al., 1998; goats, Kaminski et al., 2005) and birds
(ravens, Bugnyar et al., 2004; rooks, Schloegl et al., 2008a; and
bald ibises, Loretto et al., 2010). Like gaze detection, gaze
following may be based on a relatively simple mechanism (Povi-
nelli and Eddy, 1996a): a socially triggered orientation response
may result in subjects aligning their viewwith that of another indi-
vidual gazing toward something, allowing them to search for
something of interest themselves. While this explanation may




Figure 1. Different Levels of Gaze
Responsiveness
(A) A macaque monkey is aware that a human
experimenter looks in its direction and thus
refrains from taking the food.
(B) A raven follows the gaze direction of a human
experimenter above its head, i.e. it looks up.
(C) A raven also follows the gaze of a human exper-
imenter behind a visual barrier by relocating its
position.
(D) A dog uses the gaze direction of a human
experimenter to find food hidden under one of
two inverted cups. Dotted arrows indicate gaze
direction. Full arrows indicate movement of test
subjects.
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rically behind visual barriers (geometrical gaze following; Toma-
sello et al., 1999). Simply looking for something of interest in the
direction of the others’ gaze would result in subjects searching in
front of the barrier, but if they reposition themselves to look
behind a barrier, it suggests they appreciate the difference
between their own and another’s line of sight (Povinelli and
Eddy, 1996a). This ability has only been demonstrated in great
apes (Bra¨uer et al., 2005) and two corvid species (Schloegl
et al., 2008a). Geometrical gaze following is thought to rest on
a cognitively more sophisticated mechanism; developmental
data from ravens indicate that geometrical gaze following
develops later and shows a different habituation pattern than
gaze following into space (Schloegl et al., 2007).
A third level of gaze responsiveness is the ability to identify the
others’ target of attention, i.e., what others are looking at. Most
nonhuman species, including apes, monkeys, and ravens, find
it surprisingly difficult to use the gaze direction of a human exper-
imenter, or a conspecific, as a cue to find hidden food (Anderson
et al., 1996; Call et al., 2000; Schloegl et al., 2008b). Methodolog-
ical changes (e.g., combination of gaze with other cues) and
experience with human communicative gestures can improve
performance in various species (chimpanzees, Barth et al.,
2005; capuchins, Vick and Anderson, 2000; ravens, Schloegl
et al., 2008c; dolphins, Pack and Herman, 2004; and fur seals,
Scheumann and Call, 2004). Dogs, however, are outstanding in
solving these tasks instantly and reliably across a large number
of variations (Agnetta et al., 2000; Miklo´si et al., 1998, 2004),
and although they have not been tested formally for geometrical
gaze following, they seem to understand how barriers impair
others’ perception (Bra¨uer et al., 2006). Why do dogs outperform
primates in such tasks? One explanation may be that, during
domestication, dogs have been specifically selected to attend
to human communicative cues (Hare et al., 2002; Miklo´si et al.,
2003). Most other species seem to have problems in under-
standing the cooperative, communicative nature of the task, or
theymay bebiased by competitivemotives (Hare and Tomasello,
2004). Competitive species like chimpanzees and ravens may
thusfind it difficult todevelopcertain gaze following skills,without
this indicating a lack ofmentalistic understanding (Go´mez, 2005).798 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.Taken together, comparative evidence from human children,
nonhuman primates, other mammals, birds, reptiles, and fish
suggests that gaze responsiveness is widespread among verte-
brates. In contrast, gaze following requires active use of others’
gaze cues, and to date only five groups of mammals and three
groups of birds are known to follow gaze. Simple mechanisms
may account for tracking others’ gaze into distant space,
whereas more sophisticated mechanisms are required for
geometrical gaze tracking, which has only been demonstrated
in a handful of primate and corvid species. Most nonhuman
species have problems in identifying the target of others’ gaze.
Surprisingly, dogs provide the best-attested exception, perhaps
due to their high level of cooperativeness. Howmuch ape or cor-
vid failures depend on cognitive limitations, or cooperative
versus competitive motivations, remains an open question.
These data demonstrate the separability of gaze processing
intomultiple distinctmechanisms, perfect for building a cognitive
phylogeny (see Discussion subsection).
Nonhuman Animals Show Some of the Skills
underlying TOM
TOM is a core human capacity, underlying many pragmatic
aspects of adult language use and closely tied to child language
acquisition (de Villiers and Pyers, 2002). Since Premack and
Woodruff’s (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) seminal paper asked
‘‘Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?’’, the question of
whether or not precursors of TOM can be found in nonhuman
primates has been a core controversy (e.g., Povinelli and Vonk,
2003; Tomasello et al., 2003). For years, tests based on cooper-
ative paradigms, in which subjects must rely on help from knowl-
edgeable human experimenters, provided little evidence of TOM
in chimpanzees (Povinelli and Eddy, 1996; Povinelli et al., 1990;
Premack andWoodruff, 1978). More recent competitive designs
(Figure 2), in which subjects compete with conspecifics and/or
human experimenters for access to food (Hare et al., 2000),
have led to unexpectedly strong results, probably because
they are ecologically more meaningful to primates (Hare, 2001).
Chimpanzees can differentiate between individuals that can
and cannot see food behind a barrier (Bra¨uer et al., 2007; Hare
et al., 2000; but see Karin-D’Arcy and Povinelli, 2002), and those
that have and have not seen the hiding of food in the recent past
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have been reported for some monkeys (brown capuchins, Hare
et al., 2003; Kuroshima et al., 2002, 2003; common marmosets,
Burkart and Heschl, 2007), rhesus macaques have been shown
to discriminate between human experimenters who can and
cannot see food (Flombaum and Santos, 2005), as well as indi-
viduals who can and cannot hear the removal of food (Santos
et al., 2006), indicating multimodal sensitivity to others’ percep-
tion (but see chimpanzees; Bra¨uer et al., 2008). These data
suggest that subjects can distinguish between conspecifics
who know where food is hidden from ‘‘guessers’’ who know that
food has been hidden, but don’t know where. This ‘‘knower/
guesser’’ distinction may require the subject to represent, in
some form, themental awareness of others: a basic formof TOM.
Outside primates, the strongest evidence of mechanisms
involved in TOM comes from corvids tested with variants of the
competitive food retrieval design, involving the caching and
pilfering of food (Clayton et al., 2007). Both scrub jays and ravens
differentiate between competitors that have or have not seen
food cached in particular locations, selectively recovered food
whose caching was observed (Bugnyar and Heinrich, 2005;
Emery and Clayton, 2001), altered their cache protection strate-
gies (Dally et al., 2005, 2006) and, when tested as bystanders,
adjusted their pilfering strategies (Bugnyar and Heinrich, 2005,
2006). Scrub jays also differentiate between conspecifics that
can and cannot hear caches beingmade (Stulp et al., 2009), sug-
gesting that, as inmacaques, they can also use this knowledge in
the auditory domain.
Thus, some primates and corvids are capable of solving
‘‘knower-guesser’’ tasks: they can take others’ perception into
account and draw inferences about the probability of winning
food from, or losing it to, those others. These findings jibe with
results from geometrical gaze following (Bugnyar et al., 2004;
Tomasello et al., 1999) and support the hypothesis that the
poor performance of nonhuman primates on cooperative tasks
may better reflect their competitive motivation than their cogni-
tive abilities per se (Go´mez, 2005; Hare and Tomasello, 2004).
Little agreement exists regarding whether these results can be
interpreted as evidence for mental state attribution and basic
TOM in nonhuman animals (cf. Povinelli and Vonk, 2003; Toma-
sello et al., 2003). Indeed in most, if not all, studies, subjects had
to integrate observable features from the others’ current and
past behaviors, and might have based their decisions solely on
their own rather than the others’ perspective (Heyes, 1998;
Perner, 2010; Povinelli and Giambrone, 1999). For instance,
subjects might have picked up on perceptual features during the
experiment and, by integrating this information with their knowl-
edge about others’ behavior in competition for food or food
caches, acted according to nonmentalistic rules like ‘‘do not
go after food if a dominant has oriented toward it’’ or ‘‘recache
food in a site that is different from the one where it was cached
when the competitor was present’’ (Penn and Povinelli, 2007).
Such heuristics do not require representations of others’ mental
states, like ‘‘know’’ or ‘‘see.’’
Experience with others’ behavior not only improves the
subjects’ performance but may be a necessary precondition
for these types of social problem solving skills. Among apes,
individuals with different raising conditions (enculturated versusnonenculturated apes; Call and Tomasello, 2008) show different
social capacities. Scrub jays with pilfering experience show
recaching when observed, while birds without experience as
thieves do not (Emery and Clayton, 2001). Similarly, ravens
with appropriate experience distinguish between efficient and
inefficient human pilferers (Bugnyar et al., 2007). Thus, experi-
ence plays an important role in developing social intelligence.
However, there is good reason to doubt that primates and
corvids apply simple associatively learned rules of thumb in
knower-guesser experiments. First, a variety of surface behav-
ioral cues potentially given by conspecifics during tests hardly
affect subjects’ performance (Dally et al., 2006; Hare et al.,
2000; Kaminski et al., 2008). When subjects were required to
distinguish between others solely on the basis of surface behav-
ioral cues in experimental settings, it took them relatively long
to do so (if they succeeded at all), and they did not flexibly
apply these learned contingencies in novel situations (Call and
Tomasello, 2008; Schloegl et al., 2008b).
Therefore, it has been argued that some nonhuman animals
are capable of attributing certain mental states (Call and Toma-
sello, 2008; Clayton et al., 2007). Primates in particular may cope
with others’ intentions and goals, but not with false beliefs like
humans (Call and Tomasello, 2008). Although the capacity to
understand false beliefs among humans has long been thought
to emerge after age four (de Villiers and Pyers, 2002; Happe´,
1995), recent findings suggest that human sensitivity to others’
perceptual and knowledge states emerge earlier in ontogeny
(reviewed in Caron, 2009). Together with the possibility of TOM
in nonhuman primates, this has tempted some authors to pro-
pose that mind-reading abilities may be part of an ancient core
knowledge system for representing basic domains of cognition
(Spelke and Kinzler, 2007). Given the limitations of the compara-
tive data, this interpretation seems premature. Furthermore,
even if one accepts the idea of precursor elements of a TOM in
some nonhuman primates, striking differences exist from the
human system of understanding mental states and intentional
agency (Csibra and Gergely, 2006, 2009; Tomasello et al.,
2005), especially in their use of such understanding in communi-
cation (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2005). How do birds fit into the
picture? Given their phylogenetic distance from mammals, it
seems unlikely that their mind-reading skills are homologous
with those of nonhuman primates. More likely, they constitute
analog mechanisms, derived through convergent evolution
(Emery and Clayton, 2004), possibly as a result of similar selec-
tion pressures. Studies of avian cognition thus offer an excellent
opportunity to better understand how and why advanced social
cognitive abilities, including those related to TOM, can evolve
(see Discussion subsection).
Social Learning, Imitation, and Animal ‘‘Culture’’
‘‘Cultural’’ phenomena are of considerable theoretical signifi-
cance for evolutionary biology, because they offer a system of
inheritance and adaptation, much more rapid than genetic
transmission processes, and the prospect of a secondary form
of behavioral evolution at the cultural level (Laland and Galef,
2009). Studies of such processes in nonhuman animals are of
central importance in identifying the roots of the cultural
processes that are so distinctive in humans.Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 799
AB
Figure 2. Cooperative versus Competitive Set-Up in Knower-
Guesser Experiments
(A) A chimpanzee sees a human experimenter hiding food while two other hu-
mans are present, one actively watching the baiting process, the other one
having a bucket on his head. In the subsequent test, both humans offer their
help to the chimpanzee by pointing toward a particular container. In such
a cooperative set-up, chimpanzees must learn, slowly, to prefer the knowl-
edgeable human who had seen the caching over the guesser whose view
was blocked by the bucket.
(B) A subordinate chimpanzee (on the right) has the choice to retrieve food that
is within view of a dominant conspecific (on the left) or hidden behind a visual
barrier. In this competitive set-up, chimpanzees instantly go for the food that
cannot be seen by the dominant animal.
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of evolution, cultural evolution, in which traditions diversify
progressively in ways analogous to Darwinian biogenetic
evolution (Darwin, 1859; Dawkins, 1976; Mesoudi et al., 2004).
Language provides a particularly rich example of such cultural
evolution via historical change, sometimes termed ‘‘glossogeny’’
(Fitch, 2008; Hurford, 1990), and linguistic elements such as
words or grammatical rules can be analyzed using many of the800 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.tools of molecular phylogenetics (Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1992;
Lieberman et al., 2007; Pagel et al., 2007). At the heart of culture
is a means of high-accuracy copying, which provides the analog
of genetic transmission. Human cultural evolution also allows for
accumulation of good ideas, a fact that is central to human
cultural progress (Tomasello, 1999). There is considerable
debate about whether any animal species is capable of imitation
of a high enough fidelity to allow such cumulative change
(cf. Heyes, 2009; Huber et al., 2009; Tennie et al., 2009; Whiten
et al., 2009), and while cultural variants are well documented,
(e.g., birds, Lachlan, 1999; Slater and Ince, 1979; and great
apes, van Schaik et al., 2003; Whiten et al., 1999), the existence
of cumulative culture remains highly contentious.
The Roots of Social Learning May Be Ancient
The relation between social learning and culture is particularly
interesting. The last 2 decades have seen an explosion of
research investigating the role of social interactions in the devel-
opment of animal behavior. Recent empirical evidence docu-
ments social influences on food choice, tool use, patterns of
movement, predator avoidance, mate choice, and courtship
(Galef and Laland, 2005). Much has been discovered about the
evolutionary roots of social learning and traditions through
comparative studies (Fragaszy and Perry, 2003), especially in
fish, birds, and nonprimate mammals (Laland and Galef, 2009),
as well as insects (Leadbeater and Chittka, 2007).
There is evidence that group-living mammals (Heyes and
Galef, 1996), birds (Zentall, 2004), fish (Schuster et al., 2006),
and insects (Leadbeater and Chittka, 2007) can learn socially.
However, little is known about the evolutionary origins of this
ability. An often implicit assumption is that living in social groups
favors the evolution of social learning, leading to the idea that
social learning is an adaptation for social living. Social learning
is a core element of the social intelligence hypothesis (Dunbar
and Shultz, 2007; Humphrey, 1976), which suggests that the
physical environment does not present the kind of challenges
that lead to the evolution of a flexible, intelligent mind, but that
the social environment does. This hypothesis predicts relatively
limited intelligence in nonsocial animals. But investigation of
observational learning in nonsocial animals, such as solitary
octopuses (Fiorito and Scotto, 1992) and solitary tortoises
(Wilkinson et al., 2010), suggests otherwise: the latter can learn
to solve a detour task by observing the actions of a conspecific.
Other than these studies, this obvious route to testing the social
intelligence hypothesis in nonsocial species remains sadly
unexplored.
Vocal Imitation Provides a Form of Cultural
Transmission
Despite many examples of animal learning in the visual/motor
modalities, the best-studied examples of social learning come
from the auditory/vocal domain. A distinction is often made
between ‘‘motor’’ imitation and ‘‘vocal’’ imitation, and research
and debate on animal social learning has often focused solely
on the former (cf. Laland and Janik, 2006). However, vocal
production is also a complex motor behavior, and vocal imitation
is rendered more challenging by the fact that the movements are
mostly invisible and must be inferred from the sounds produced.
Despite these difficulties, complex vocal learning has evolved
repeatedly in nonhuman animals, and vocal imitation currently
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considered birdsong the best known analog to human spoken
language (Darwin, 1871). Since then, numerous further species
capable of vocal learning have been discovered.
One well-studied example of cultural transmission of complex
vocal patterns is provided by baleen whale song, especially that
of the humpback whale. Humpback males sing long, complex
songs during the mating season that are thought both to repel
rival males and attract females. At a given time, all of the males
in a given area sing the same song, but this song typically
changes gradually throughout the mating season (Payne et al.,
1983) with complete song replacement in about 15 years (Payne
and Payne, 1985). Such replacement cannot be explained by
genetic change or male replacement, and thus provides a clear
example of a culturally shared and ever-changing vocal reper-
toire. Under certain special circumstances, local dialects can
changemuchmore rapidly. Such an abrupt change was recently
documented off eastern Australia, when the population rapidly
adopted a novel song apparently carried by just a few males
from the west coast population (Noad et al., 2000). Although the
functional significance of these changes remains unknown,
the results suggest that some preference for novelty may drive
the cultural evolution of whale song.
Although Darwin knew that many songbirds must be exposed
to conspecific song in order to sing properly themselves, it
wasn’t until the 1960s that scientists began a detailed investiga-
tion of their vocal learning ability (Marler and Tamura, 1964).
Marler has memorably dubbed the songbird’s need for external
input, and the propensity to internalize it, an ‘‘instinct to learn’’
song. Birdsong learning provides an excellent analog for human
speech and music learning (e.g., Marler, 2000), convergently
evolved and lacking the complexities of semantic meaning that
human language entails. Today, birdsong is the best available
model system for understanding the neural and genetic bases
of a culturally transmitted signaling system (cf. Catchpole and
Slater, 2008; Marler and Slabbekoorn, 2004).
The ‘‘innate versus learned’’ dichotomy is inapplicable to bird-
song, which is a complex acquired behavior depending upon an
innate learning system that filters and guides learning, much like
human language. Although the capacity for vocal learning itself is
innate (and only present in roughly half of bird species), song
learning requires both rich input from the environment and a pro-
longed period of practice via vocal play. This learning process is
shaped by inborn constraints: birds seem to possess an innate
filter that allows them to ignore the songs of most species and
attend preferentially to conspecific song.
Again like language, the songbird’s instinct to learn is funda-
mentally social: in the natural environment singing adults must
be available if the young bird is to sing properly. Although
some bird species will learn a song from recordings when iso-
lated (e.g., Marler, 1970), others will not, and young males in
many species learn preferentially from a living ‘‘tutor’’ bird (Bap-
tista and Petrinovich, 1986; Immelman, 1969; Mann and Slater,
1995). Finally, although adult males sometimes sing when alone
(e.g., in territory defense), courtship song when a female is
present is typically more intense and can invoke different
patterns of brain activity and gene expression (Jarvis et al.,
1998).Babbling and Subsong
Another apparently fundamental similarity between birdsong
and human speech is the need for a period of vocal play early
in life, during which an individual vocalizes quietly to itself. This
stage, termed ‘‘babbling’’ in speech and ‘‘subsong’’ in birds,
appears to be necessary for adequate vocal learning (Catchpole
and Slater, 2008; Locke and Pearson, 1990).
The process of song learning varies considerably among
species. An important distinction is made between open- and
close-ended learners. The former group, exemplified by
canaries, retains an ability to learn new songs throughout life.
The discovery that this open-ended learning results from neuro-
genesis in the song nuclei of adult canaries prompted the redis-
covery of mammalian neurogenesis, leading to the explosion of
research on this topic today (Nottebohm, 2006). In contrast,
close-ended or age-limited learners (e.g., zebra finches or
white-crowned sparrows) pass through a ‘‘sensitive period’’
during which they memorize one or more songs, storing
templates that they later match. After ‘‘song crystallization,’’
the song stays fixed for the rest of the bird’s life.
Vocal play has been hypothesized to allow the bird to tune its
motor output to auditory input (Marler and Peters, 1982), allow-
ing each individual to adjust to the variation in syringeal structure.
This hypothesis should, in principle, apply to individuals of any
vocal learning species, since the individual vocal apparatus
must always vary to some degree. These observations suggest
that other vocal learning species should also go through a stage
of vocal play during ontogeny (Fitch, 2006).
Evidence for a ‘‘Cultural Ratchet Effect’’ in Songbirds
A crucial aspect of human culture, sometimes said to be uniquely
human, is the cultural ratchet effect: the accumulation of benefi-
cial knowledge and practices. While birdsong provides a nice
example of ‘‘culture’’ in the simple sense of cultural transmission
of learned features, this is not necessarily directional. Indeed, in
many cases, the existence of local birdsong ‘‘dialects’’ is best
explained by simple copying errors (Catchpole and Slater,
2008). Copying errors might lead to local divergence, akin to
random drift in genetics, without any directional change or
improvement being implied (cf. Lynch and Baker, 1994).
Nonetheless, the best known example of a directional cultural
ratchet effect in animals comes from research with zebra finches
(Figure 3, Fehe´r et al., 2009). Because songbirds require expo-
sure to conspecific song to sing normally, birds raised in isolation
typically produce a rough, relatively structureless song as adults.
Fehe´r and colleagues introduced such isolate male birds into
social groups, where youngmaleswere exposed only to isolates’
poor-quality song. The song of the first-generation birds differed
from that of the tutors, in the direction of typical wild-type song.
This process was then repeated, with first-generation birds
raising and tutoring a second generation and so on. Within three
to four generations, these isolate lines produced something
approaching normal song. Thus, simply passing through the
filtering process of individual ontogeny over multiple generations
is apparently enough to sculpt depauperate raw material into
species-typical form.
This process has an interesting parallel in human language
(cf. Fitch, 2009a). Humans raised in total isolation from language
will not invent a normal language themselves (Blumenthal, 2003;Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 801
Generation One: Isolate Song
Generation Two: Improvement




Cumulative Cultural Change In Birdsong
Figure 3. Cumulative Cultural Change in
Birdsong
The best examples of cumulative cultural change
in nonhuman animals come from birdsong. An iso-
lated male songbird, deprived of song input during
the critical period, will produce an aberrant
‘‘isolate’’ song. However, if this aberrant song is
provided to a second generation of young males,
they will learn it and improve upon it, bringing it
closer to the wild-type. Repeating this process
over generations leads to a song little different
from normal wild-type song.
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lies, it is common to see ‘‘home sign’’ systems develop, which
support basic communicative needs but have nothing like the
rich vocabulary and syntax of real signed languages (Goldin-
Meadow and Mylander, 1998). However, when many children
were brought together in a school for the deaf in Nicaragua, a
few ‘‘generations’’ of deaf students developed their own new
signed language with a rich lexicon and complex grammar
(Senghas et al., 2005). This has parallels in the process by which
depauperate pidgin languages, historically used for crude
communication in adult trading or slave communities, have
developed in a few generations into creoles (such as Tok Pisin
or Papiamentu): full languages with a rich, complex linguistic
structure (Mu¨hlha¨usler, 1997).
Nonvocal Social Information Transmission Is Possible
with Multiple Learning Mechanisms
Comparative psychologists have focused on mechanisms that
control learning through observation and on their contribution
to the transmission of innovations. Highly controlled experiments
have been conducted with a wide range of species, investigating
what exactly is copied, and what information about the observed
action the observer uses (Heyes, 1994; Whiten and Ham, 1992;
Whiten et al., 2004; Zentall, 2004, 2006). Animals behave like
others for various different reasons. They may simply be predis-
posed to engage in certain behaviors when others are seen
engaging in those behaviors (species-typical behaviors). Being
in the presence of conspecifics may result in increased general
arousal, which makes certain behaviors more probable (motiva-
tional effects). The behavior of others may draw attention to a
place or object independently of the behavior itself, and that
attention may facilitate learning (perceptual enhancement
effects). Such learning may be merely socially biased (Fragaszy
and Visalberghi, 2004) by, for example, following one’s mother
and developing preferences for certain routes or food trees
(Schiel and Huber, 2006), followed by individual learning there.
Observers may also learn the effect of the observed behavior802 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.on the environment, which may facilitate
performance by the observer (observa-
tional conditioning, emulation, and afford-
ance learning). Finally, observers may
learn somepart of a demonstrated behav-
ior by either copying it blindly (mimicry), or
by understanding the goals and inten-
tions of the model (imitation). Imitation inthis sense is an important neurocognitive process that bridges
the gap between one mind and another, powering cognitive
and social development in infancy and childhood, promoting
empathy and cooperation in our relationships with others, and
providing a distinctively human channel of cultural inheritance
(Heyes, 2009).
Imitation Research Has Addressed Two Distinct
Problems
Imitation research traditionally focuses on two distinct problems.
The correspondence problem, favored by cognitive neuroscien-
tists, asks how is it possible for actions as seen to be matched
with actions as imitated. The transfer of skill problem, favored
by ethologists and comparative psychologists, asks how com-
plex behaviors can be acquired by observation. Most scholars
agree that when an individual replicates an action it observes
being performed by another individual, a matching system is
required to allow conversion of observed actions into actions
executed by oneself. In other words, visual input needs to be
transformed into corresponding motor output. The same prin-
ciple holds for the auditory modality, e.g., in song learning.
Most neurocognitive models of imitation require that
observers possess a motor representation of the demonstrated
action before they observe it being performed (cf. Hurley and
Chater, 2005). But, if the essence of imitation lies in the activation
of responses already in the repertoire of the observer, how
are new skills acquired? Imitative learning in the sense of
the acquisition of new skills by observation must therefore be
distinguished from response facilitation, priming, stimulus
enhancement, and other forms of perception-motor coupling,
or many other forms of social influences.
Imitation Allows the Cultural Transmission
of Information
It has been clear for more than a century that imitation provides
a nongenetic route for the inheritance of phenotypic attributes
and has the potential to support culture. The issues that remain
unclear concern the type of imitation that has this potential, and
its importance, relative to other cognitive and social attributes,





































Figure 4. Marmoset Imitation
(A) Common marmosets precisely imitate a con-
specific using a peculiar technique to open a
food canister. Motion analysis confirmed the high
copying fidelity of the observers.
(B) The head movement was calculated from the
movements of five trace points (blue dots): (1)
corner of the mouth, (2) outer corner of the nostril,
(3) canthus, (4) corner of the white spot of the fore-
head, and (5) a corner at the base of the ear-tufts.
(C) One example each of the head position of the
model, one observer, and one nonobserver in
1/25 s time intervals (red lines indicate head incli-
nation) illustrate the high matching degree of
model and observer, but considerable deviation
of the nonobserver’s, movement trajectory.
(D) The mean discriminant scores for movements
of the observers were closer to the mean of the
model than to the nonobservers in 99.96% of the
cases (Voelkl and Huber, 2007).
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support cumulative culture, imitation must achieve a significant
degree of copying fidelity and involve or enable learning, i.e.,
the acquisition of novel behavior (Heyes, 2009; Huber et al.,
2009). Besides birdsong learning, it remains unclear whether
other forms of animal social learning have the capacity to
support cultural inheritance.
These issues have fueled the question of which species have
the cognitive potential for imitation. Apes imitate in various forms
(Whiten et al., 2004), but despite a century’s efforts it remains
unclear whether monkeys possess this ability (Fragaszy and
Visalberghi, 2004). Although the sweet potato washing of
Japanese macaques is a widely cited example of tradition
formation in nonhuman animals, it is unclear whether social
learning, let alone imitation, is involved. Furthermore, capuchin
monkeys repeatedly fail to learn how to use an object as a tool
by observation (reviewed in Fragaszy and Visalberghi, 2004).
These findings led to a consensus view that culture is rare in
primates, because true imitation is rare.
But recently,monkeys’ inability to imitate has beenchallenged.
Monkeys show cognitive imitation by copying an expert’s use
of a rule (Subiaul et al., 2004), recognize when they are being
imitated (Paukner et al., 2005; Paukner et al., 2009), and imitate
adult facial movements as neonates (Ferrari et al., 2006, 2009).
Also, the discovery of mirror neurons (neurons that fire both
when monkeys watch another animal perform a goal-directedNeuron 6action and when they perform the same
action) in rhesus monkeys suggests
that they possess the neural framework
for the matching system of imitation
(Ferrari et al., 2009; Rizzolatti and Craigh-
ero, 2004). However, can monkeys also
imitate novel behaviors (solving the trans-
fer of skill problem)?
An observer’s copy can vary greatly in
its degree of matching to the model’s
template. So-called demonstrator-
consistent responding implies that the
subjects copied some part of theobserved actions. Interestingly, the largest body of evidence
for action imitation again comes from birds (reviewed in Zentall,
2004). The most stringent test of whether animals can learn a
new movement by observation involves the demonstration of
at least one action that is unlikely to be performed, unless the
subject had the opportunity to witness its performance (Bugnyar
and Huber, 1997). Recent studies with common marmosets
have provided evidence of very precise copying of new move-
ments (Figure 4), challenging current theories of imitation in
terms of associative learning, human-specific adaptations, and
mirror neurons (Voelkl and Huber, 2000, 2007). Furthermore,
recent evidence that archerfish seem capable of learning how
to anticipate the path of moving aerial prey by observing a skilled
conspecific suggests that precise movement copying might be
widespread in the animal kingdom (Schuster et al., 2006).
Selectivity in Social Learning
An emerging theme in studies of the ability of animals to learn
from others is that observers are selective in many respects,
including what, when, and from whom to learn. This selective
nature of social learning is buttressed by theoretical models of
the adaptive advantages of social learning, which predict that
organisms should copy when uncertain, copy the majority, and
copy if better (Galef and Laland, 2005).
Species Show Differential Selectivity in What and Whom to
Observe. Social learning is expected to occur in circumstances
in which the observer can acquire new knowledge from others.5, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 803
Figure 5. Kea Selectivity
Keas were allowed to observe a trained conspecific that demonstrated how to
open a large steel box with rewards (toys). The lid of the box could be opened
only after three locking devices had been dismantled (a bolt, a split pin, and
a screw). The figure shows an observer pulling the metal split pin out of the
screw in its first encounter with the box. Observers showed much greater
success in opening the locking devices than nonobservers (Huber et al., 2001).
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affiliation, dominance, and tolerance to make the correct deci-
sions of whom to solicit in agonistic conflicts, whom to groom,
and whom to avoid. Monitoring the behavior of others is there-
fore a prerequisite for any form of behavioral adjustment during
cooperation, competition, and communication. Whom you
watch is also of crucial importance for the acquisition and spread
of social information. However, time and/or habitat constraints
limit an individual’s opportunity to observe every other animal
within the group or every action performed: observers must be
selective. There are striking differences between species (Range
et al., 2009; Range and Huber, 2007; Scheid et al., 2007), most of
which are found in the attention-holding (duration of looks) rather
than the attention-getting (frequency of looks) processes, which
is more important for learning about the sequence and coordina-
tion of actions and their consequences.
Selectivity in Learning about the Environment. In addition to
selectivity in the distribution of attention, selectivity may also
depend on knowledge about the social and physical environ-
ment. To understand results of what others do, one needs to
relate actions to effects. If the action itself is not copied, the
environmental change must be understood in physical or causal
terms and then reproduced by the observer’s own means
(emulation). By observation of a demonstrator successfully
obtaining food, observers don’t just learn to manipulate the
tool, but also to use the tool for that function. This learning has
been specified as learning about the operating mechanisms of
objects or environment, properties of objects, relations between
objects and functions, and the causal structure of the task
(Byrne, 1998; Whiten et al., 2004).
For more than a decade, evidence for this kind of intelligent
social learning was restricted to chimpanzees (Tomasello et al.,
1987). Data from tool-using birds remain far from convincing
in this respect (woodpecker finches, Tebbich et al., 2002; New
Caledonian crows, Hunt and Gray, 2003). But keas, curious
and manipulative mountain parrots, have proved able in the lab
to selectively execute those actions from their motor repertoire
that are sufficient for reproducing the observed effects (Figure 5,
cf. Huber et al., 2001). This is especially interesting because keas
have never been observed using tools in the wild. Perhaps
animals that use tools may lack true causal understanding, but
possess innate dispositions to manipulate certain objects, and
an ability to learn during a sensitive phase early in ontogeny
what effects these have (Tebbich et al., 2002). Indeed, pigeons
can learn about the consequences of a demonstrator’s actions,
without actually learning about the actions themselves (Zentall,
2004). Nevertheless, the translation of an observed environ-
mental relationship into behavior that produces the same conse-
quence is a quite remarkable cognitive ability, perhaps no less
complex than imitation. It may be that a fascination with
human-like imitation has deflected attention from equally valid
and effective forms of social learning.
Intelligent Copying Requires Inhibition and Control. From a
neurocognitive perspective, emulation may also entail the ability
to inhibit or control copying others. In humans at least, such
inhibitory processes depend on the functioning of the same
higher-order brain centers that are involved in attributing mental
states to others (Brass et al., 2009). In humans, these control804 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.functions appear to be specialized for social interaction. But
nonhuman animals have also demonstrated the ability to select
intelligently just those pieces of information which are useful,
neglecting details of behavioral form judged to be redundant or
ineffective. When a human demonstrator showed several tool-
using actions on a complex food container, using a mixture of
effective and ineffective actions, young chimpanzees copied all
actions only if they couldn’t see the immediate effects of these
actions. If they could, they ignored ineffective components,
and predominantly tried effective ones instead (Horner and
Whiten, 2005), suggesting that emulation is the favored strategy
of chimpanzees when sufficient causal information is available.
Strategic Imitation Is Also Not a Human Specialty. For many
decades, imitation studies focused on controlled, intentional
(or ‘‘true’’) imitation because it was thought that imitation must
be controlled in order to play an important role in cognitive and
social development, or to mediate cultural inheritance. However,
research on the chameleon effect in human adults (Chartrand
and Bargh, 1999; van Baaren et al., 2009) and ‘‘overcopying’’
in children (Whiten et al., 2009) suggests that, even when control
is limited, imitation can have systematic and far-reaching effects
on cooperative behavior and the potential for cultural evolution.
One test for true imitation that controls for immediate, auto-
matic (or ‘‘blind’’) copying is the deferred imitation test. Here,
the animal is required to wait and engage in other behavior
before replicating the previously seen actions. Recent evidence
on this comes from dogs. Joy, a Weimaraner, performed at high
levels of matching degree with delays shorter than 5 s, and once
matched a familiar action even after 35 s (Huber et al., 2009).
Strategic imitation also requires the observer to make sense of
an action, and then recreate the most effective or rational solu-
tion. When confronted with demonstrated actions lacking
a target object (vacuum actions, e.g., the human model jumping
over nothing), Joy responded by performing an action which was
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Figure 6. Rational Imitation in Children and
Dogs
Both human infants and dogs evaluate the actions
of others and decide whether or not to copy them.
Children (or dogs) watched a model turn on a light
box (or push a bar) by touching its top with her
forehead, not her hands (or by pushing it down
with a paw, not themouth). If amodel had a blanket
wrapped around her body (or a ball in the mouth)
during the demonstration (‘‘occupied’’ condition),
only about 20% of observers activated the box
with their heads (or pushed the bar with the paw).
The majority of the children (or dogs) used the
hand (or mouth)—a more efficient way of turning
on the lights (or depressing the bar). Perhaps
they recognized that the model couldn’t use her
hands (or the mouth) and had to use her head (or
paw). But when the model performed the task
without the blanket (or without the ball) (‘‘free’’
condition), the majority of a second group of
observers opted to copy the model’s head (or
paw) movements, as if deciding that if the model
did it, then it must be a better approach (Gergely
et al., 2002; Range et al., 2007).
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chimpanzees, orangutans, parrots, dolphins, and dogs; re-
viewed in Huber et al., 2009), animals were not particularly sensi-
tive to details of the actions, but instead attempted to achieve
a functional fit. These species’ actions seem to be goal directed
and object bound, and shortcuts reveal that they are often driven
by efficiency. Interestingly, autistic children also show superior
performance with object manipulations relative to body-oriented
movements (Heimann et al., 1992).
Preverbal Human Children, Chimpanzees, and Dogs Exhibit
Rational Imitation. The transmission of cultural knowledge re-
quires learners to select what information to retain and imitate
when observing others’ skills. Human imitative learning is a
unique mechanism of naive pedagogy that facilitates fast and
efficient cultural knowledge transfer, rather than a simple slavish
reenactment of actions of a demonstrator. Fourteen-month-old
human infants show evidence of this rational imitation ability
(Gergely et al., 2002) and imitate peculiar actions only when
the demonstrator had no obvious reason to execute them, sug-
gesting that their imitation is a selective, interpretative (rational)
process. They thus interpret others’ behavior as goal directed
and, as a result, predict the most efficient action to achieve a
goal. Early sensitivity to ostensive-communicative cues and to
the efficiency of goal-directed actions is thought to be a crucial
prerequisite for such relevance-guided selective imitation
(Csibra and Gergely, 2009). Although this competence was
previously thought to be human specific, recent experiments
show an analogous capacity in dogs (Figure 6) and chimpanzees
(Buttelmann et al., 2007; Range et al., 2007). As in human chil-
dren, inferential competence seems not to require the attribution
of mental states but relies simply on the evaluation of the observ-
able facts: the action, the goal state, and the situational
constraints.
Summary: A Rich Comparative Database
for Studying Social Learning
Comparative research on social learning, vocal learning, motor
imitation, and emulation provides a very rich set of models for
understanding both the neural mechanisms and evolutionarybases for both homologs and analogs of the mechanisms that
support language and culture in our own species. The long-held
belief that only humans and great apes can imitate has been chal-
lenged, suggesting that many taxa are living in an imitative
universe. But outside of birdsong, the question of which species
exhibit cultural patterns, particularly the cumulativity typical of
human culture, currently remains a focus of vivid debate.Testing Hypotheses about Language Evolution
with Comparative Data
We end our review with some illustrations of the power of the
cognitive phylogenetic approach to test hypotheses concerning
neural mechanisms and evolutionary function.
The ‘‘Large Carcass’’ Niche: Parallels between Hominids
and Ravens
In the course of hominid evolution, the proportion of meat in the
diet increased, reflecting an increased importance of scavenging
and hunting (Blumenschine and Selvaggio, 1988; Bunn and Kroll,
1986). Meat eating had important effects on nutrition and social
behavior of hominid groups, long thought to be central in under-
standing the evolution of human cognitive and communicative
skills (Dart, 1949; Lee and De Vore, 1968; Montagu, 1976). In
particular, cooperative hunting, scavenging, and food sharing
have been suggestive as powerful drivers of the information
sharing capacity embodied in language (Isaac, 1978). Linguist
Derek Bickerton has recently offered a quite specific hypothesis
along these lines (Bickerton, 2010) and singled out one design
feature of human language (Hockett, 1960) as both crucial and
very rare: the capacity for displacement. Human language,
unlike most animal signals, can convey information about
objects or events that are not present. Bickerton proposes that
the driving force behind this feature during hominid evolution
was the need for cooperative scavenging of large carcasses,
which would be too large to be moved, but so rich as to consti-
tute a windfall for any primate group able to defend and butcher
them. Bickerton proposes that the exigencies of this specific
ecological niche drove the evolution of symbolic communicationNeuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 805
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started protolanguage’’ (p. 209 of Bickerton, 2010).
Unfortunately, suchhypothesesaredifficult, if not impossible, to
test solely on the basis of the archeological record, leading some
commentators to dismiss them as untestable speculation (e.g.,
Lewontin, 1998). Taking the comparative perspective, however,
displacementand recruitment are not unique tohumans: precisely
these functions lie at the heart of recruitment signaling in social
insects, particularly the honeybee dance ‘‘language’’ (von Frisch,
1967). Paralleling social insects, we suggest that ravens, large-
brained birds, support the idea that a scavenging lifestyle selects
for socio-cognitive and communicative abilities.
Ravens Recruit Conspecifics to Scavenge Large Carcasses.
Although ravens are omnivorous, they regularly feed on large
mammal carcasses (Ratcliffe, 1997). Carcasses are rich but
highly ephemeral food sources that are difficult to locate; more-
over, they are often defended by predators or dominant conspe-
cifics, and thus difficult to access by vagrant, nonbreeding
ravens, who are generally subordinate to territorial breeding
birds. Such subordinate birds cope with this challenge by team-
ing up (Heinrich, 1988; Marzluff and Heinrich, 1991). Ravens
engage in two forms of recruitment: using nocturnal roosts as
information centers (Marzluff et al., 1996; Wright et al., 2003)
and attracting others via food calls (Bugnyar et al., 2001; Heinrich
and Marzluff, 1991). The former strategy allows birds to search
for food individually and cover a broad area (Dall and Wright,
2009). Upon encountering a food source, single birds remain
silent, return to the nearest communal roost and return to the
carcass the next day together with other birds (Heinrich, 1988).
The number of ravens arriving at the new food source increases
linearly over days, suggesting that one bird (most likely the
finder) continues recruiting others until the source is depleted
(Marzluff et al., 1996; Wright et al., 2003). Interestingly, the
recruited individuals remain near one another at roosts (Wright
et al., 2003), suggesting that certain birds group into temporary
foraging bands.
Alternatively, ravens may use food calls at short distances.
Younger birds (<5 years of age) give specific calls, ‘‘yells’’ (Hein-
rich, 1988) or ‘‘haa’’ calls (Bugnyar et al., 2001), when they
encounter food that is difficult to access and/or feared. These
calls develop from juvenile begging calls and are affected by
hunger level (Heinrich and Marzluff, 1991) as well as the quality
and quantity of a food source (Bugnyar et al., 2001): specifically,
ravens call more often when hungry or when encountering
preferred food, and stop calling once they manage to gain
access to the food (Bugnyar et al., 2001; Heinrich and Marzluff,
1991). As in other species (e.g., Evans, 1997), food calling in
ravens rests on a strong motivational basis. Nevertheless,
because the timing and the location of calling signals the occur-
rence of food to listeners, it may be functionally referential (Bug-
nyar et al., 2001). Besides food calls, ravens give a variety of
other calls during foraging that may provide information about
feeding opportunities (Heinrich et al., 1993). These calls are not
specific to the occurrence of food but are primarily given during
food-related interactions (Bugnyar et al., 2001).
Although both food calls (Heinrich and Marzluff, 1991) and
food-associated calls given during feeding (Heinrich et al.,
1993) may attract nearby conspecifics, only food calls do so at806 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.the appropriate time, i.e., when recruiting others is advanta-
geous for overcoming territorial defense and/or neophobia.
Food calling decreases with an increasing number of ravens
gathering at the food source (Bugnyar et al., 2001), indicating
an ‘‘audience effect’’ on the signaler. Adult territory holders
may try to aggressively prevent nonbreeders from food calling
(Heinrich andMarzluff, 1991), indicating some risk of punishment
to callers. Possibly as a consequence, not all birds that
encounter food behave similarly, and there is substantial indi-
vidual variation in the number of calls given. Others must be
within hearing distance for the food calling system to work.
Otherwise, callers run the risk of attracting territory holders and
facing punishment without increasing their chances of accessing
food. Birdsmay thus be sensitive to the presence of other ravens
and capable of adjusting their recruitment behavior accordingly.
Interestingly, in some areas, ravens typically search for food in
loose groups and readily coordinate via calls upon encountering
feeding opportunities (Bugnyar and Kotrschal, 2001; Dall and
Wright, 2009). In other populations, individual search and long-
distance recruitment at roosts seems to be the default strategy
(Heinrich et al., 1994; Marzluff et al., 1996).
Testing the Recruitment Hypothesis with Ravens. The need to
find ephemeral food, combined with the need to overpower food
defenders, has led to a sophisticated system of information
sharing in ravens. Birds both use cues given by successful
foragers and actively signal the occurrence of food to others.
The timing and location of food calling appears to provide func-
tionally referential information to receivers. Moreover, ravens
seem to be capable of flexibly controlling these signals, using
long-distance recruitment and food calls only when appropriate.
Such sophisticated call usage is probably learned.
The communication and cooperation of nonbreeding ravens to
gain access to food sets the stage for another potential cognitive
challenge: to share or secure food from others. Crowd-foraging
ravens hardly share but carry off consecutive loads of food,
which they scatter hoard at amoderate distance from the feeding
site (Heinrich and Pepper, 1998). In such a situation, communi-
cation is counterproductive and one would expect strong selec-
tion for controlling behaviors and signals. Indeed, ravens are
outstanding at deceptively withholding information (Bugnyar
and Heinrich, 2006; Bugnyar and Kotrschal, 2002), potentially
creating the selective force favoring judging others’ perspectives
(Bugnyar et al., 2004) and knowledge states (Bugnyar and
Heinrich, 2005).
Returning to Bickerton’s ideas about recruitment driving
symbolic language, food calls do not constitute displacement,
since the food is typically visible to the calling bird. However,
the transfer of information that occurs at roosting sites certainly
does qualify as displacement. Unfortunately, very little is known
about how this communication occurs (but see Wright et al.,
2003). Although ravens are difficult to observe at their roost sites,
these birds are a living species that meets many of the criteria
Bickerton lays out in his selective model for protolanguage in
extinct hominids, and thus allow some of his predictions to be
tested. For instance,wemight expect birds informedof a carcass
to react strongly, and negatively, if the carcass were not present
the next day. If such behavior were repeated (as devious exper-
imenters can easily arrange), a bird could experimentally be
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us to probe the level of detailed information conveyed at roost
sites, as has been done effectively in honeybees (Gould and
Gould, 1988; Lindauer, 1971). In general, our understanding of
raven communication remains quite rudimentary, but Bicker-
ton’s hypothesis offers both a reason for looking harder and
some testable predictions about what information might be
conveyed and why.
The Kuypers/Ju¨rgens Hypothesis: Direct Connections
Are Needed for Vocal Learning
Our second example hypothesis involves the neural circuitry
underlying vocal learning. Neurons in the lateral motor cortex
play a central role in human speech and song: destruction of
the cortical face and larynx area abolishes voluntary learned
vocalizations, but spares innate vocalizations like cry and
laughter (Foerster, 1936; Groswasser et al., 1988). In contrast,
lesions to motor cortex have no effect on vocalization in
nonhuman primates (Aitken, 1981; Sutton et al., 1974), leading
many researchers to posit two distinguishable neural control
systems involved in vertebrate vocalization. The first is broadly
shared and relies upon the midbrain periacqueductal gray as
the center coordinating both the movements of the vocal
production system and the emotional or motivational meaning
of the calls produced. The second system is cortically driven,
and is present in humans (and perhaps other species with
voluntary control over complex, learned vocalizations), but not
other primates (cf. Deacon, 1992; Ju¨rgens, 1998; Ju¨rgens
et al., 1982; Myers, 1976).
What specific differences between these two circuits might
underlie their different uses for controlling learned and innate
vocalizations? A first clue came from a series of pioneering
studies by the comparative neurologist Hans Kuypers. Kuypers
compared cortical projections to brainstem motor nuclei in
humans and other mammals by combining experimental lesions
with Nauta/Gygax staining of degenerating axons to map the
descending connections from cortex to the brainstem and spinal
cord (Kuypers, 1958a, 1958b; Kuypers, 1973). Based on 4
human stroke victims, 4 chimpanzees, and 17 macaques, he
found that primates have direct monosynaptic connections
from cortex to a variety of motor nuclei, while cats possess
only indirect, multisynaptic connections. Direct cortical connec-
tions may underlie the greater precision and voluntary control
primates have over their faces, tongues, and limbs. However,
Kuypers observed degenerating axons in the nucleus ambiguus,
which encompasses laryngeal motor neurons, only in human
brains. This observation was extended by Ju¨rgens et al. (1982),
who observed prolonged mutism in a stroke victim after bilateral
cortical lesions. When an equivalent lesion was experimentally
induced in a squirrel monkey, no changes in its vocalizations
were observed, though it lost control of its jaw, lips, and tongue.
The primate observations have been confirmed with modern
tract tracing (cf. Ju¨rgens, 2002), and the human results have
been replicated in an additional stroke patient (Iwatsubo et al.,
1990). These converging data provide strong support for the
Kuypers/Ju¨rgens hypothesis: that direct connections frommotor
cortex onto the primary motor neurons controlling the vocal
apparatus, especially the larynx, are necessary to support com-
plex learned vocalizations. Given these neuroanatomical differ-ences between humans and nonhuman primates, which corre-
late perfectly with the behavioral lack of vocal learning in other
primates, this hypothesis is quite plausible. But is it testable?
Testing Kuypers/Ju¨rgens in Vocal Learning Species. Because
vocal learning has evolved independently in multiple vertebrate
lineages, the answer is yes. Vocal learning of complex songs
appears to have evolved convergently in three bird lineages
(songbirds, parrots, and hummingbirds, Jarvis, 2004; at least
four mammalian clades: humans, seals, cetaceans, and bats,
Janik and Slater, 1997; Kno¨rnschild et al., 2010; and, as sug-
gested by recent data, elephants, Poole et al., 2005). If the
Kuypers/Ju¨rgens hypothesis is correct, members of these
species should have direct connections between telencephalic
neurons and the primary vocal motor neurons in the brainstem,
and such connections should not be present in related clades
incapable of vocal learning.
Songbird data are consistent with these predictions. Birds lack
a neocortex and produce sound using a novel organ, the syrinx,
and we must adapt the hypothesis to adjust for these funda-
mental differences. Tract tracing studies show that cells in the
final songbird motor region in the pallium (homologous to
mammalian cortex) indeed senddirectmonosynaptic projections
to the motor neurons controlling the syrinx whose cell bodies lie
within the lower brainstem (Wild, 1993, 1997). Such direct
connections are not present in subsocine birds, the closest song-
bird relatives that do not learn their songs. These avian data thus
are consistent with the Kuypers/Ju¨rgens hypothesis.
A skepticmight correctly observe that the differences between
birds and mammals, both in terms of neuroanatomy and vocal
production, make this a less than fully convincing case. Fortu-
nately, there are nowat least three nonhumanmammalian clades
that are known to vocally imitate. All of these have neocortex, and
at least two of them (bats and seals) use the ‘‘standard’’ mamma-
lian vocal apparatus (lungs and larynx) to create their vocaliza-
tions. Although there are nontrivial issues involved in tract tracer
studies in these species, the predictions of the Kuypers/Ju¨rgens
hypothesis are clearly amenable to further testing.
Mirror Neurons and Language Evolution
Our third example involves mirror neurons, one of the more
fascinating neuroscientific findings in the last few decades
(di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Mirror
neurons were initially discovered in macaques in the context of
hand movements and visual perception, and the discovery of
mirror neurons was seen by some as support for the gestural
protolanguage hypothesis: the idea that hominids evolved
language in the gestural domain before the evolution of spoken
language (Arbib, 2005; Hewes, 1973). Because apes have
good imitative abilities for manual gestures, in contrast to their
inability to mimic sounds, mirror neurons might have provided
a preexisting neural substrate for signal learning in the LCA of
humans and apes. However, the discovery of macaque mirror
neurons that respond to the sound of actions cast some doubt
upon this conclusion (Kohler et al., 2002), as does the fact that
the macaque monkeys studied have poor imitative abilities in
either gestural or vocal domains (cf. Fitch, 2010).
The argument that mirror neurons imply a gestural protolan-
guage has been further weakened by the discovery of audiovo-
cal mirror neurons in songbirds (Prather et al., 2008). In twoNeuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 807
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Figure 7. A Preliminary Cognitive Phylogeny for Gaze Processing
(A) The widespread occurrence of gaze sensitivity (GS) implies the presence of GS in the LCA of all amniotes.
(B) In contrast, the scattered distribution of gaze following (GF) and geometric GF (GGF), based on current knowledge, leaves open the possibility of convergence
in birds and mammals, or homologous descent from an early amniote.
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neurons in the higher vocal center (HVC) fire both when the
bird sings certain syllable types and when it hears these types
sung. These auditory mirror neurons are thought to represent
a corollary motor discharge used to sharpen the match between
motor and auditory output. Mirror properties were found only the
subpopulation of HVC neurons that project to Area X, a striatal
nucleus important in song learning, suggesting that they play
a role in song acquisition and maintenance. These observations
suggest that any form of sensory motor integration can be sup-
ported by mirror neurons, which can flexibly develop in the brain
of vertebrates capable of vocal imitation. It is thus unclear what
implications mirror neurons have, if any, for the phylogenetic
timing of the human capacity for vocal learning. Again, conver-
gently evolved birdsong provided the crucial test case.
The FoxP2 Gene Has Been Repeatedly Recruited
in Vocal Learning Circuits
Finally, research into the genetic basis of human speech and
birdsong learning has provided an intriguing new indication of
the relevance of research on birdsong to the evolution of human
language. Recent research has strongly implicated the impor-
tance of the transcription factor gene FoxP2 in human speech,
because clinical data show that speech production is severely
disrupted when this gene suffers a missense mutation (cf.
Vargha-Khadem et al., 2005). In songbirds, FoxP2 is upregulated
in nuclei involved in song learning (Haesler et al., 2004), and
reduction of FoxP2 expression levels in song nuclei of zebra
finches leads to less accurate, incomplete song learning (Haesler
et al., 2007), providing direct evidence for the importance of
FoxP2 in vocal learning across species.
Given that humans and birds evolved vocal learning conver-
gently and have significant differences in both neural architec-
ture and vocal production, it was quite surprising to find that
the same gene plays a causal role in these species. This appears
to be another example of ‘‘deep homology’’ in which the devel-
opment of convergent structure is mediated by homologous808 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.genes (Gehring and Ikeo, 1999; Shubin et al., 1997). FoxP2
seems to be the first example of deep homology in a gene
involved in spoken language (cf. Fitch, 2009b). Why should re-
use of a transcription factor occur? Scharff and Haesler (2005)
suggest that FoxP2 plays a functional role in procedural motor
learning in all vertebrates, and that this circuitry is ‘‘exapted’’
when species evolve vocal learning, a hypothesis consistent
with the fact that similar song nuclei appear to have evolved
(or been co-opted) in the separate evolution of vocal learning
in hummingbirds, parrots, and songbirds (Jarvis, 2004).
The FoxP2 gene has only started to yield its secrets, and we
can expect much more to be learned from a broad comparative
approach. In mice, successful genetic manipulations of FoxP2
provide a powerful tool to begin exploring, in detail, the role of
this gene in the developing mammalian brain (Enard et al.,
2009; Groszer et al., 2008; Shu et al., 2005). Intriguingly, bats
appear to have undergone powerful selection on the FoxP2
gene, leading to an unparalleled FoxP2 diversity in this order
(Li et al., 2007). Although little is known, at present, about the
function of FoxP2 in the bat brain, the recent discovery of com-
plex vocal learning in a bat (Kno¨rnschild et al., 2010) suggests
that bats may also have much to teach us about the function
of this gene in mammalian vocal control.
Summary
We have reviewed the evidence in animals for multiple mecha-
nisms underlying human social cognition. The picture is not
simple: we find various abilities dotted about the vertebrate
phylogenetic tree in a complex pattern that defies easy descrip-
tion. In some cases (e.g., simple gaze detection), we find abilities
in a broad variety of species, and are tempted to declare this
basic form of social intelligence a shared vertebrate homolog.
In others (e.g., geometric gaze following), the very restricted
evidence currently available suggests scattered examples of
convergent evolution. However, in many cases, we lack
adequate data to conclusively decide whether a result found in
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homolog: the crucial data from other vertebrates are unavailable.
Thus, for many traits, broader comparative data sets will be
required to support clear conclusions.
Figure 7 illustrates our approach, providing a preliminary
cognitive phylogeny of vertebrate gaze processing. Basic gaze
sensitivity has been observed in virtually every species tested,
suggesting that this is a basic vertebrate capability. Provisionally
assuming that gaze sensitivity is homologous in these species,
we infer that it was already present in the LCA of amniotes about
340 million years ago. Gaze following has also been observed in
many species, but examples are currently limited to birds and
mammals. This leaves two options: that avian and mammalian
gaze following evolved convergently, or if they are homologs,
that gaze following was also present in the common ancestor
of living amniotes. The crucial data for resolving this involves
further research on social cognition in reptiles (tortoises, lizards,
crocodilians); without such data, either option seems equally
likely. Finally, regarding geometrical gaze following, strong
data exists now only for corvids, apes, and dogs; again conver-
gence or homology are possible. What we can conclude for
certain, contra an older tradition expecting only primates to be
‘‘sophisticated gaze followers’’ (Tomasello and Call, 1997), is
that geometric gaze following either evolved convergently in cor-
vids and dogs OR is much more ancient, either in the LCA of
mammals or possibly even the LCA of living amniotes.
Although the cognitive phylogenetic approach highlights the
need for more data, one thing that is clear is that a linear scala
naturae approach to cognition, where animal intelligence is ex-
pected to increase with phylogenetic proximity to humans, can
be firmly rejected. We have focused on data from birds and other
nonprimate animals to emphasize this fundamental point. A
modern approach to comparative cognition must fully embrace
a tree-oriented approach, firmly rooted in Darwin’s conception
of life as one vast family tree, if it is to make sense of cognitive
evolution. The now-abundant data indicating highly developed
cognition in birds poses a clear challenge to the primate-
centered viewpoint that has dominated psychology and neuro-
science for the last century; birds are currently neck-and-neck
with the smartest primate in many tests of both social and phys-
ical intelligence (cf. Emery and Clayton, 2004). Indeed, we have
argued here that the best parallels for some aspects of language
and culture are to be found not in other primates, but in song-
birds. How such high levels of cognitive performance are gener-
ated in brains a fraction of the size of those of most mammals
remains a fundamental puzzle for computational neuroscientists,
suggesting perhaps that mammalian neocortex is not the most
efficient computational substrate available among vertebrates.
But our purpose here is not to place birds on a pedestal; rather,
we aim to show howa very wide variety of species, from tortoises
to dogs, can both inspire new hypotheses about cognitive evolu-
tion and provide multiple ways to test such hypotheses.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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